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I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act1 (“FOIA”), a law that appears to
be relatively straight-forward on its face, has generated a substantial
amount of case law over the last forty-five years that clearly reflects the
tension between the public’s right of access to government records and
the government’s need to withhold records in order to protect national
security interests, whether those interests pertain to classified or sensitive
but unclassified information. While the FOIA does not require a
requester to cite a reason or purpose when submitting a FOIA request for
government records,2 FOIA requesters will sometimes articulate reasons
why they are requesting the records and those reasons may include the
following: educational purposes, need for public debate on government
actions and/or proposed actions, authorities for said government actions,
notification to the public as to how the United States Government
(“USG”) is spending taxpayer dollars, and/or fundamental principles of
democracy. On the other hand, there are those who place their lives on
the line for national security reasons and those charged with protecting
the United States who are concerned that releasing too much information
places the nation’s security, its citizens, and those who defend the nation
at risk.

Administrative Procedures Act [hereinafter “APA”] § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2015); The
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was passed in 1966 pursuant to the APA of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-487, 80 S TAT. 250 (1966), which amended the APA of 1946, ch. 324, 60 S TAT.
238 (1946). However, as initially drafted, the APA of 1966, § 3, 80 S TAT. 250, placed the
FOIA in Title 5 of the U.S.C., specifically 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1966), with the title of Public
Information, availability. Further, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 S TAT. 54 (1967) amended the FOIA
and placed the statute in its current location, specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
2 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3)(A)(ii) (2015).
1
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II. THE HISTORY BEHIND PRESIDENT LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON’S
SIGNING OF THE FOIA
In viewing the FOIA from today’s perspective, one could argue that
the tension between public access to government records and protection
of national security was clearly evident on July 4, 1966,3 the day
President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the FOIA into law. On more
recent anniversaries of the FOIA’s date of enactment, commentators have
discussed President Johnson’s (supposed) feelings about the FOIA and
concluded that he was not in favor of it for multiple reasons.4 First,
commentators note that President Johnson only issued a written
statement, rather than having a formal bill signing ceremony. 5 Further,
there was no appointment annotation made to President Johnson’s daily
calendar.6 Mr. Bill Moyers, former White House Press Secretary,
bolstered the proposition that President Johnson was not in favor of the
law when, as the guest speaker at the Twentieth Anniversary of the
National Security Archive at George Washington University, he stated:
I was there, as the White House press secretary, when
President Lyndon Johnson signed the act on July 4, 1966;
signed it with language that was almost lyrical – ‘With a deep
sense of pride that the United States is an open society in
which the people’s right to know is cherished and guarded.’
Well yes, but I knew LBJ [Lyndon Baines Johnson] had to be
dragged kicking and screaming to the signing ceremony. He
hated the very idea of the Freedom of Information Act; hated
the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets
and opening government files; hated them challenging the
official view of reality. He dug in his heels and even
threatened
to pocket veto the bill after it reached the White
House.7
3 The FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966 and took effect on July 4, 1967. See
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966); see also and Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
4 See Ted Bridis, LBJ Loath to Approve Information Act in 1966, Feared the Disclosure
of National Secrets, BOSTON . COM NEWS (July 4, 2006), http://www.boston.com/news/nation
/washington/articles/2006/07/04/lbj_loath_to_approve_information_act_in_1966; see also
Thomas S. Blanton, Ed., Freedom of Information at 40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut
Bill with Signing Statement, THE NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE GEO. WASH. UNIV. (2006),
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194.
5 Bridis, supra note 4.
6 See President’s Daily Diary, July 4, 1966, 1963-1969, Gen FE 14-1, Access to
Records, WHCF, LBJ Library; see also THOMAS S. B LANTON , ED., Freedom of Information
at 40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut Bill with Signing Statement , Doc. 39, THE
NAT’ L S EC . ARCHIVE GEO. WASH. UNIV. (2006), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSA
EBB/NSAEBB194.
7 Mr. Bill Moyers, Address at the Twentieth Anniversary of the National Security
Archive: In the Kingdom of the Half-Blind (Dec. 9, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/anniversary/moyers.htm).
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However, possibly the strongest evidence that President Johnson
was not in favor of the FOIA may be the substantial changes made to the
bill signing statement as initially drafted, the revised statements, the press
release statement, and the bill signing statement with President Johnson’s
signature. As noted by Mr. Thomas S. Blanton, Director of The National
Security Archive, “the signing statement includes more about the need to
keep secrets than the urgency of openness.”8
The National Security Archives has obtained numerous documents
pertaining to the enactment of the FOIA from President Lyndon Baines
Johnson’s Library and Museum.9
The documents include two
marked drafts of the bill signing statement, both with handwritten edits,
a press release statement (dated July 4, 1966), and a final bill signing
statement with President Johnson’s signature.10 There are differences
between all four documents; some more substantial than others. Excerpts
of the first draft bill signing statement (with no label), as originally typed,
are as follows:
This legislation implements a principle of paramount
importance to our democratic system. A democracy
functions best when people have access to information about
their government. They must be able to ascertain the policies
and rules by which departments and agencies operate.
Mistakes should not be hidden by pulling the curtains of
secrecy around a decision which can be revealed without
injury to the public interest. Good government functions best
in the open, in the full light of day.
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of
individuals may require that some documents not be made
available to the public. As long as threats to peace exist, there
must be military secrets. A citizen must have the right to
complain to his government and to give information in
confidence…I sign this measure with a deep sense of pride
that our nation, unlike some nations, values highly the right
of the people to know how their government is operating.11
Corresponding excerpts of the second draft bill signing statement
(marked “Draft II”), as originally typed, show only slight modifications

8

Blanton, supra note 4.
Blanton, supra note 4.
10 See Statement by the President, Includes Variants, (includes variants: (1) Unsigned
Draft; (2) Unsigned Draft; Draft II Annotated by LBJ himself, and (3) Annotated Draft with
Handwritten Note from G.C., http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%
2031.pdf), Records of White House Offices, 1963–1969, White House Press Office Files, Box
49, June 30, 1966 – July 15, 1966, PR 210a – PR 2134a, LBJ Library [hereinafter “Statement
by the President 1963-1969”]; see also Thomas S. Blanton, Ed., Freedom of Information at
40, LBJ Refused Ceremony, Undercut Bill with Signing Statement, THE NAT’L SEC.
ARCHIVE, DOC . 31 (2006), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/.
11 Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10.
9
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from the first draft when compared to the second draft. The second
draft’s corresponding excerpts are as follows:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential
principles: a democracy works best when the people know
what their government is doing. They must have access to
the policies and rules by which departments and agencies
operate. Government officials should not be able to pull
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public. Good government functions best
in the full light of day.
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of
individuals may require that some documents not be made
available. As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there
must be military secrets, a citizen must be able in confidence
to complain to his government and to provide information
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press
without fear of intimidation or reprisal….
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the
United States is an open society in which the decisions and
policies—as well as the mistakes—of public officials are
always 12subjected to the scrutiny and judgement [sic] of the
people.
The Office of the White House Press Secretary issued a press release
of the bill signed into law; however, it is not only different from the first
and second drafts, but is also different from the bill signing statement that
contains President Johnson’s signature. The corresponding excerpts of
the press release statement are as follows:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential
principles: a democracy works best when the people have all
the information that the security of the nation permits. No
one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around
decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public
interest.
At the same time, the welfare of the Nation or the rights of
individuals may require that some documents not be made
available. As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there
must be military secrets. A citizen must be able in confidence
to complain to his government and to provide information
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press
without fear of reprisal or of being required to reveal or
discuss his sources. . .
I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the
United States is an open society in13 which the people’s right
to know is cherished and guarded.
12

Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10.
See White House Press Release, Statement by the President upon Signing S. 1106 (July
4, 1966), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/Document%2037.pdf) (available
at Records of White House Offices, 1963-1969, White House Press Office Files, Box 49,
13
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The corresponding typed excerpts of the bill signing statement with
President Johnson’s signature reflect substantial differences with the first
and second drafts as well as the press release statement. The
corresponding excerpts from President Johnson’s hand-signed statement
are as follows:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential
principles: a democracy works best when the people have all
the information that the security of the nation will permit.
At the same time, the welfare of the nation or the rights of
individuals may require that some documents not be made
available. As long as threats to peace exist, for example, there
must be military secrets, a citizen must be able in confidence
to complain to his government and to provide information
just as he is—and should be—free to confide in the press
without fear of reprisal or being required to discuss or reveal
his sources. . .
I signed this measure with a deep
sense of pride that the
United States is an open society.14
In examining the statement with President Johnson’s signature, it is
interesting to note that it did not contain the following statement: “No one
should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be
revealed without injury to the public interest.”15 It is also interesting to
note, when examining various legislative records marking significant
milestones of the FOIA, the legislative records do not cite the bill signing
statement with President Johnson’s signature; rather the legislative
records cite the White House Press Release statement containing the
sentence deleted from President Johnson’s signed statement.16
The first and second draft statements contain handwritten edits, and,
upon viewing, one could reasonably conclude that the edits were made
by two different individuals. In addition to the draft statements and
President Johnson’s signed statement, the National Security Archive also
located a handwritten note from President Johnson’s library (with the
initials G.C.). It reads: “We have talked to Bill Moyers and given him
this statement along with your thought about newspapers protecting their
6/30/66-7/15/66, PR 210a – PR 2134a, LBJ Library) [hereinafter “White House Press
Release”]; see also Blanton, supra note 4.
14 See White House Press Prelease, supra note 13; see also Blanton, supra note 4.
15 See White House Press Prelease, supra note 13; see also Blanton, supra note 4.
16 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) and JOINT
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUB. L. NO. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). However, President Johnson
did not include this particular sentence in the statement he ultimately signed; see also supra
note 10.
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sources of information. He will work on it and be back in touch later.”17
According to Mr. Blanton, it is unclear from the documents whether
President Johnson personally edited the statements or directed his Press
Secretary, Mr. Moyers, to make the changes.18 This article is not
attempting to answer this question or resolve the apparent conflicts
between the various documents (e.g., press release statement versus
hand-signed statement). Rather, the revisions to the bill signing
statements (drafts, press release statement, and final, hand-signed
statement) show the tension that existed, from the onset, between the
public’s right to access and the USG’s need to protect national security
interests, and determining what that balance should be. This foreshadows
the litigious debate between the two competing interests that continues to
exist to this day.
III. THE HISTORY BEHIND ACCESS OR RATHER LACK OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT RECORDS
According to the National Freedom of Information Coalition,
Dr. Harold L. Cross is generally given credit as the author of the FOIA,
as it was DR. CROSS’ 1953 book, The People’s Right to Know: Legal
Access to Public Records and Proceedings, which “laid the
groundwork for the legislation.”19 In his 1953 book, Dr. Cross identified
three legal authorities the USG historically relied upon as a legal basis to
withhold records from the public and/or Congress and opined that,
“through legislative inaction, the weed of improper secrecy had been
permitted to blossom and was choking out the basic right to know . . . .”20
Those three legal authorities were the Records Act of 1789,21 the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) of 1946,22 and the Executive
Privilege.23
A. The Records Act of 1789
The Records Act of 1789 is also known as the housekeeping statute
17

Statement by the President 1963-1969, supra note 10.
Bridis, supra note 4.
19 National FOIA Hall of Fame, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL., http:
www.nfoic.org/print/national-foia-hall-fame (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); Hall of Fame, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/hall-of-fame/harold-l-cross (last
visited Sept. 9, 2016).
20 H.R. R EP . N O. 89-1497, pt. 1, at 23 (1966).
21 Id. (citing the Records Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 68 (1789)) (codified in Rev. Stat. Title IV
§ 161 (1875)), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1966).
22 Id. (citing APA, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946)), amended by APA, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1966).
23 Id.
18
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as it gave the executive agencies authority to set up offices and maintain
government records.24 While various FOIA cases indicate that the USG
relied upon the Records Act of 1789 as authority to withhold records,
there is nothing within the Act itself that mentions access and/or lack of
access to government records by the public.25
In 1875, the Records Act of 1789 was subsequently amended and
codified as follows: “The head of each Department is authorized to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his
Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and
performance of its business and the custody, use, and preservation of the
records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”26 Again, the amended
statute, on its face, does not purport to authorize the USG to withhold
records requested from an individual or entity. However, according to a
1958 Congressional Report, the first apparent use of the Records Act of
1789 as authority to withhold records was in 1877 when the United States
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provided this recommendation to
President Rutherford B. Hayes.27 From 1877 to March 1958, the Records
Act of 1789 was routinely used by various federal agencies as authority
to withhold records requested from individuals and/or entities.28 On
August 12, 1958, Congress again amended the Records Act of 1789 to
add the following statement: “This section does not authorize
withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of
records to the public.”29 While the added sentence placed federal
agencies on notice that the Records Act of 1789, as amended, should no
longer be used as legal authority to withhold records, a few federal
agencies still relied upon this statute as the legal basis to withhold records
from the public up until 1972.30
B. The Administrative Procedures Act
As compared to the Records Act of 1789, the APA has a relatively
short history as it was enacted in 1946.31 Section 3 of the APA of 1946,
entitled Public Information, requires federal agencies to publish or make
available organizational data, general statements of policy, rules, and
Chrysler Corp. v. Sec’y of Def., 441 U.S. 281, 309-310 (1979).
1 Stat. 68 (1789).
26 Rev. Stat. Title IV § 161, (1875), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), amended by 5
U.S.C. § 301 (1966).
27 H.R. R EP . N O . 85-1621, 1958 WL 3907 (1958) (Leg. Hist.).
28 See H.R. R EP . N O. 85-1621.
29 Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547 (1958).
30 See Joint Comm. Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-502.
31 CONG. REC. 2135, 2165 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1946).
24
25
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final orders, unless the records pertained to or involved “(1) any function
of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any
matter relating solely to the internal management of any agency . . . .”32
The APA of 1946 also permits the USG to withhold requested records if
there was a confidential need, based upon good cause, or the person
requesting the records was not “properly and directly concerned”33 to the
records requested.34 Again, Congressional history reveals that, in spite
of the APA of 1946 Section 3’s title, Public Information, federal agencies
routinely used the law as authority to withhold information rather than
releasing information to the public when requested,35 and that
“[i]mproper denials occur[ed] again and again. For more than ten years,
through the administration of both political parties, case after case of
improper withholding based upon 5 U.S.C. [§] 1002 has been
documented.”36 In drafting the 1966 FOIA, Congress wanted to firmly
establish a philosophy of full agency disclosure to any person 37 unless
information was specifically exempt from release under clearly
delineated statutory language, to provide an avenue of redress of judicial
review (which was not available in 5 U.S.C. § 1002) to those that may
have been wrongfully denied access to government records.38
At the time Congress drafted the FOIA, Congress believed that it
had established workable solutions between the public’s right of access
to government records and the USG’s need for withholding records.
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not
an impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to protect
one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or
substantially subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable formula
which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places

32

Id.
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 89TH CONG. 48, FEDERAL PUBLIC RECORDS LAW: FIRST
SESSION ON H.R. 5012-21, 5237, 5406, 5520, 5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, 7161 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 89th Cong. 48 (1965).
34 S EN . R EP. NO . 89-813, at 38 (1965).
35 H.R. R EP . N O . 89-1497, pt. 3 at 26.
36
Id.
37 The FOIA, as initially enacted, did not define any person. However, in the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 2002, Congress restricted access under the FOIA and noted that for any
records of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act
of 1947), if the requester is a government or representative of a government that is not a State,
territory, commonwealth, or district of the United States. National Security Act of 1947, 50
U.S.C. § 401a(4). See Pub. L. No. 107-306 § 312, 116 Stat. 2383 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(E) (2003)).
38 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), at 6-8.
33
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emphasis on the fullest possible disclosure.39
Nonetheless, it is clear to anyone who works with the FOIA and
government releases of information (whether the record is labeled
classified, for official use only, unclassified, controlled unclassified
information or has no marking at all) that, under the current rules and
regulations, legal determinations for releases under the FOIA appear to
be as varied as the number of federal attorneys who work in this area of
law. While some may consider this an exaggeration, all one has to do is
briefly review the 2009 Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom
of Information Act 40 to understand how complex the FOIA and
government releases of information can be and currently is. When one
combines the FOIA with Executive Orders (e.g., Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information41), Department of Defense
(“DoD”) classification regulations, and then each individual Services’
and/or Combatant Commands’ classification regulations (if the entity has
implemented any), the complexity of the issues are multiplied many times
over.
Since the FOIA’s enactment, it has been amended at least seven
times,42 sometimes as a result of court decisions and sometimes as a result
of a political scandal (e.g., Watergate).43 Some of the tension and/or
frustration between access to government records and non-disclosure of
government records exists because of the changes in technology, the
current world situation, the United States prolonged “War on Terror,”44
the current fight against al-Qaeda and/or those that seek to attack the
39

S EN. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOJ GUIDE TO THE F REEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
(2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act (last visited Sept. 9,
2016).
41 See Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 705 (Jan. 5, 2010).
42 FOIA Legislative Materials, U.S. D EP ’ T OF J USTICE , http://www.justice.gov/oip
/foia-legislative-materials (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
43 The 1974 Amendment was passed over President Gerald Ford’s veto. The 1976
Amendment was part of the Government Sunshine Act. The 1996 Amendment is known as
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendment. The 2002 Amendment placed limits
on foreign agents’ ability to request records under the FOIA. Other amendments were made
in 1986, 2007, and 2009. See FOIA Legislative History, THE NAT’ L S EC . ARCHIVE,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2016); FOIA
Legislative Materials, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-legislativematerials (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
44
On August 6, 2009, Director John Brennan, then head of the White House’s
Homeland Security Office, stated at a speech to the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, that “war on terrorism,” “global war,” and “fighting jihadists’” would no longer be
“acceptable words inside the White House . . . The only terminology . . . the administration is
using is that the U.S. is ‘at war with al Qaeda.’” See White House: ‘War on Terrorism’ Is
Over, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/6/
white-house-war-terrorism-over/.
40
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United States (whether from within the United States or outside of the
United States). However, some of the tension exists because of a lack of
understanding of the DoD’s rules and regulations about how the DoD
labels (or marks) documents, what those labels mean, and what is
required under the information security and/or classification rules and
regulations.
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOIA
When a federal agency receives a proper FOIA request, which
includes a reasonable description of the requested records and is
submitted in accordance with the agency’s published regulations, the
federal agency “shall make the records promptly available to any
person.”45 The agency generally has twenty business days to comply with
the request, although the agency may extend the time limit by no more
than ten working days for unusual circumstances.46 If the agency fails to
meet the processing-time requirements, or if the FOIA request is denied47
or redacted pursuant to the withholding exemptions articulated in the
FOIA,48 the requester may file a complaint in federal district court, to
include the district where the requester lives, the requester’s principle
place of business, where the federal agency records reside, or in the
District of Columbia.49 Moreover, “[T]he court shall determine the
matter de novo,50 and may examine the contents of such agency records
in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) . . . and
the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.”51
V. JUDICIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE FOIA
FOIA cases are routinely decided on motions for summary
judgment,52 which are appropriate “when the pleadings, the discovery

45

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2015).
Id. §§ 552(a)(6)(A), (B).
47 See id. § 552(a)(4) (for other reasons stated within the statute, e.g., denial of request
to waive fees, a finding of no records, etc.).
48 Id. § 552(b)(2) to (b)(9).
49 Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
50 “De novo is from Latin, meaning ‘from the new.’” When a court hears a case de novo,
it is deciding the issues without reference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by
the previous court to hear the case. An appeals court hearing a case de novo may refer to the
trial court’s record to determine the facts, but will rule on the evidence and matters of law
without giving deference to that court’s findings.” WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY , CORNELL UNIV.
LAW SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
51 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2015).
52 Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
46
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materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations ‘show [ ] that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’”53 In most FOIA cases, once the documents
are properly identified, the FOIA requester and the federal agency
(simply) have different interpretations as to the application of the
exemptions, based upon the law, to the redacted information/record.54
Thus, the court determines whether the agency sustained its burden that
the requested records are exempt from release under the FOIA. 55
Since the FOIA’s enactment, courts have consistently recognized
Congress’ intent to favor release over the withholding (or non-release) of
government records by specifically acknowledging in numerous opinions
that the FOIA mandate is one of release, and a federal agency may only
deny a request (or portion thereof) when the records fall within one or
more of the enumerated nine withholding exemptions, which are to be
narrowly construed. If the federal agency decides to withhold the records
(or a portion thereof), the federal agency bears the burden of proof for
withholding the records, and such determination is reviewed by the court
de novo.56
To determine whether the federal agency met its burden that the
requested records are exempt from release, courts consider the underlying
purpose of the FOIA, and some of those cited purposes include the
following:
a. “[T]o pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and
to
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”57
b. “[T]o ‘contribut[e] significantly to public understanding
of the operations or activities of the government.’”58
FOIA’s fundamental policy “focuses on the citizens’
right to be informed about ‘what their government is up
to.’ Official information that sheds light on an agency’s
performance of its statutory
duties falls squarely within
that statutory purpose.”59
c. “[T]o ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
53 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing F ED.
R. CIV. P ROC. 56(a)).
54 See Jones-Edwards v. Appeal Bd. of the Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Agency, 352 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
55 Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
56 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989); U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370,
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
57 U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 352, 361 (1976).
58 N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Dep’t
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 749, 775) (1989)).
59 Id. at 632.
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functioning of a democratic society, needed to check
against corruption60and to hold the governors accountable
to the governed.”
d. “[T]o permit access to official information long shielded
unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a
judicially enforceable public right to secure such
information from possibly unwilling official hands.”61
e. “‘[T]o promote honest and open government and to
assure the existence of an informed citizenry
to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.’”62
After recognizing the underlying release nature of the FOIA, courts
have consistently addressed the narrow construction of the FOIA
exemptions, the burden of full or partial redaction (to include the
obligation to reasonably segregate the releasable portion from the nonreleasable portion) is upon the federal agency, and the agency generally
fulfills its obligations via affidavits (or declarations), usually with a
Vaughn Index.63 In addition, so long as the “agency’s affidavit describes
the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail,
demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the
claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the
record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then affidavit alone
warrants summary judgment.”64 Exemption (b)(1), Classified
Information, is not excluded from the narrow construction of the
withholding exemptions under the FOIA.
VI. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN C LASSIFIED INFORMATION
AND FOR OFFICIAL USE O NLY INFORMATION ?
Before examining the withholding of records as classified
information pursuant to exemption (b)(1), one must first understand the
difference between classified information and for official use only
information. And, in order to understand this difference, one must
understand the USG’s terms and labels or markings. Unfortunately, there
appears to be a lack of understanding regarding restrictive labels or
markings on DoD records, especially if the label is for official use only
60 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citing STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE
MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, at 38).
61 Mink v. EPA, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), superseded by statute 5 U.S.C.
§552(a)(4)(B)(1974).
62 Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Grand
Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1999)).
63 See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 500-506; (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64 ACLU. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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(“FOUO”) or unclassified//for official use only (“ U//FOUO”). In an
August 2, 2013, Christian Science Monitor article entitled, Too Many
Classified Papers At Pentagon? Time For A Secrecy Audit,65 an
anonymous congressional staffer questioned the United States
Department of Army’s (“DA”) need to mark a Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) audit report U//FOUO. According to the
journalist, again citing the anonymous congressional staffer, the GAO
report was unfavorable of the “military’s Distributed Common Ground
System, a computer program that US troops use to process intelligence in
war zones.”66 While the congressional staffer was not authorized to speak
about the GAO report, the staffer stated:
The Army chose to classify that document in such a way that
prevented the GAO from displaying it on its web site. It’s
very easy to put a classification on a document to keep it out
of public view. . . . There was nothing in that report that
included national security secrets, but the Army used the
classification process in that moment to keep that
report off
the web site and available for anyone to access.67
Both the title of the Christian Science Monitor’s article and the
congressional staffer’s reference to U//FOUO as a classification label
reflects the lack of understanding of the term FOUO or U//FOUO, not
only from a classification perspective, but also from the FOIA
perspective.
A. What Is for Official Use Only Information and How Does It
Relate to the Classification Regulations and Releases Under
the FOIA?
First and foremost, FOUO is not a classification level and thus, it is
not a classification label or classification marking. There are only three
classification levels, and they are defined in Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information (“E.O. 13526”). Per E.O.
13526, section 1.2(a), information may only be classified at three levels
and those classification levels shall be applied to information based upon
an original classification authority’s (“OCA’s”) determination that the
unauthorized release of the information could be expected to cause some
level of national security harm.68 The three classification levels are: (1)
Top Secret, which applies to information which if released without
authority could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave
65 Anna Mulrine, Too Many Classified Papers at Pentagon? Time for a Secrecy Audit,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0802/
Too-many-classified-papers-at-Pentagon-Time-for-a-secrecy-audit.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, §§ 1.1, 1.2; 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
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damage to the national security; (2) Secret, which applies to information
which if released without authority could reasonably be expected to
cause serious damage to the national security; and (3) Confidential, which
applies to information which if released without authority could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. 69
Even if E.O. 13526, section 1.2(a) fails to clearly state that there are
only three classification levels, E.O. 13526, section 1.2(b) asserts that,
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used
to identify United States classified information.”70 The DoD further
emphasized this point in implementing its regulations, again only
recognizing three classification levels and labels,71 but also for FOUO
information in that “by definition, information must be unclassified in
order to be designated FOUO.”72
Given that there are only three enumerated classification levels, it
should be clear, or at least intuitive, that information labeled or marked
either FOUO or U//FOUO is unclassified information. Thus, the milliondollar questions become what is FOUO information and how does it
pertain to releases under the FOIA? Again, going to the regulation,
FOUO is a dissemination control (label or mark) applied by the DoD to
unclassified information when disclosure to the public of that particular
record, or portion thereof, would reasonably be expected to cause
foreseeable harm to an interest protected by one or more of FOIA
exemptions (b)2 through (b)9.73 The DoD is not authorized to withhold
FOUO information under FOIA exemption (b)(1), Classified
Information, as FOUO information is not classified information.74
One may argue that the journalist and congressional staffer used the
term classifying under a more generic definition of arranging the item
(e.g., report) according to subject matter or assigning the report to a
category,75 in this case the category of information that falls within FOIA

69

Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.2; 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010).
Id.
71 U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EF. M ANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 1, D O D I NFO . S EC . P ROGRAM :
OVERVIEW , CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION , enclosure 4, paras. 3, 34 (Feb. 24,
2012) [hereinafter “OVERVIEW , CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION ”].
72 U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EF. M ANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 4, D O D I NFO . S EC . P ROGRAM :
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO, supra note 71, at enclosure 3, paras. 2b(2), 12. (Feb. 24,
2012) [hereinafter “CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFO”].
73 Id. at para 2a, 11.
74 One caveat as a federal agency does have the ability to classify a record after receipt
of a FOIA request, if it meets all other requirements under the Executive Order 13526 for
classification purposes. See Exec. Ord. No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7d, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29,
2009).
75 Classifying, WEBSTER ’ S N EW COLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY (150th ed. 1981).
70
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exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9).76 However, it is also important to
understand that simply marking the information FOUO does not
automatically qualify it for non-release under the FOIA.77 If a FOIA
request is received for a record that has been labeled FOUO or U//FOUO,
it would be processed under the FOIA to determine if it truly qualifies for
redaction under exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9).78
The journalist and anonymous congressional staffer also imply that,
if the DA had not marked the report FOUO, the record is automatically
fully releasable and immediately available to the public. However, this
conclusion is also inaccurate. The fact that a DoD entity has not placed
any label and/or dissemination control marking on a record does not in
and of itself automatically mean the record is fully releasable and
available to the public. As stated in DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4,
“the absence of the FOUO marking does not automatically mean the
information shall be released.”79 In the case of the GAO report, even if
the DA had not marked or labeled the report FOUO or U//FOUO, this
would not mean that the GAO could place the report on its webpage. As
required by DoD guidance, “[a]ll DoD unclassified information MUST
BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED FOR RELEASE through standard
DoD Component processes before it is provided to the public (including
via posting to publicly accessible websites) in accordance with DoDD
[Department of Defense Directive] 5230.09 . . . and other applicable
regulations.”80
In sum, by definition FOUO is unclassified information. The fact a
document is labeled or has a dissemination control marking of FOUO
does not mean that the record is not released to the public under the FOIA.
Alternatively, the fact that a record does not have any label or control
marking on the record does not mean that the record is automatically fully
available to the public. The function of the FOUO label/mark is to place
on notice or to inform a DoD employee that the record may contain
76 Because the congressional staffer clearly states that there were no harm to national
security interests (which pertain only to classified information and the level of national
security harm), it is doubtful that the journalist and congressional staffers used the term
“classify” in the generic sense to categorize the report based upon information that is protected
by (b)(2) through (b)(9). In addition, the article quotes Steven Aftergood, Director of the
Federation of the American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, as saying:,
“Currently, there is ‘robust disagreement’ both within the intelligence community and within
federal agencies about what should be classified.” However, for purposes of this article, this
argument of a generic term of classification and categorizing the records as exempt from
release under the FOIA pursuant to (b)(2) through (b)((9) will be considered.
77 C ONTROLLED U NCLASSIFIED I NFO , supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.
78 C ONTROLLED U NCLASSIFIED I NFO , supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.
79 C ONTROLLED U NCLASSIFIED I NFO , supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 2c(2), 13.
80 C ONTROLLED U NCLASSIFIED I NFO , supra note 72, at enclosure 3, paras. 1f, 10.
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special categories of information which require some level of special
processing, handling and/or storing. The FOUO information contained
in the document could be attorney-work product or attorney-client
communications; unclassified but sensitive security protocols; or
personally identifying information such as a social security number, date
of birth, medical information; or other categories of information which
fall within FOIA exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9), and thus require some
level of special processing, handling and/or storing of the information.
B. Will Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified
Information, Solve the Confusion Between a Restrictive,
Unclassified Dissemination Control Label and Releases Under
the FOIA?
Shortly after assuming office, President Barack Obama issued
various memorandums concerning transparency of the federal
government. In a January 21, 2009 memorandum, President Obama
stated, “My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented
level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the
public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation,
and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote
efficiency and effectiveness in Government.”81 Part of the transparency
process was the direction that a task force take to review executive
agencies’ processes on controlled, unclassified information82 to include
the procedures for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating sensitive
but unclassified (“SBU”)83 information. The Secretary of Homeland
Security and the United States Attorney General co-chaired the task
force84 and on August 25, 2009, issued a report entitled Report and
81 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Administration of Barack H. Obama, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 10 (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.archives.gov/files/cui/documents/2009-WH-memo-ontransparency-and-open-government.pdf).
82 Memorandum on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information for
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (May 27, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-classified-information-andcontrolled-unclassified-informat).
83 Sensitive But Unclassified (“SBU”) information is a generic term used to refer to 117
different types of designations used with the Executive Branch for documents/information
that require some level of protection but do not meet the standards for national security
classification. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND S EC . AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REP. AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE P RESIDENTIAL T ASK F ORCE ON CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED
INFO (2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cui_task_force_rpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 12,
2016) [hereinafter “REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS ”].
84 Memorandum on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified Information,
supra note 82.
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Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Controlled
Unclassified Information.85
Overall, the task force made forty
recommendations adjusting or modifying current procedures for
marking, safeguarding and disseminating SBU information. One of those
recommendations was the establishment of one single, standardized
program for identifying, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating
information across the federal government as the task force had identified
approximately 117 different SBU terms used by various federal
agencies.86 Based upon the task force’s recommendations, President
Obama directed his National Security Staff to draft an Executive Order
supporting key elements of the task force’s recommendations that would
apply to the full spectrum of SBU information (and not be limited to
terrorism records/information).87
On November 4, 2010, E.O. 13556, Controlled Unclassified
Information, was issued88 and designated the National Archives and
Records Administration (“NARA”) as the Executive Agent (“EA”) for its
implementation.89 Pursuant to E.O. 13556, the controlled unclassified
information (“CUI”) label “shall serve as exclusive designations for
identifying unclassified information throughout the executive branch that
requires safeguarding or dissemination controls, pursuant to and
consistent with applicable law, regulations and Government-wide
policies.”90
Pursuant to E.O. 13556, section 4(d), NARA was to establish and
maintain a publicly available CUI registry that identifies each category
and/or sub-category of records requiring limited distribution.91 As part
of its implementation process, in June of 2011, NARA issued guidance
to federal agencies requiring them to designate CUI records/information
that required safeguarding or dissemination controls based upon existing
85

REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS , supra note 83.
REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS , supra note 83.
87 See R EP . AND R ECOMMENDATIONS , supra note 83; see also CUI Chronology and
History, NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN ., http://www.archives.gov/cui/chronology.
html (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
88 Exec. Order No. 13556; 75 Fed. Reg. 68, 675 (Nov. 9, 2010).
89
Id.
90 Id.
91 While Executive Order No. 13556 required that the CUI registry to be established
within one year of the date of the Order, which would have been no later than November 9,
2010, as of January 26, 2015, the CUI registry list was not complete. And, while the CUI
Registry webpage appears to be final, NARA has the following statement on its registry’s
webpage: “Existing agency policy for all sensitive unclassified information remains in effect
until your agency implements the CUI program. Direct any questions to your agency’s CUI
program office.” See NAT’ L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN . CUI REGISTRY ,
https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
86

ECKART - MACRO - 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

9/5/2017 3:28 PM

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

259

law, regulation, or a Government-wide policy. In addition, federal
agencies were to provide to NARA the underlying authority requiring the
safeguarding or dissemination control of the record.92 Since NARA’s
initial guidance was issued, many categories or subcategories of records
or information have been identified as CUI, and, per NARA, the CUI
Registry “identifies all approved CUI categories and subcategories,
provides general descriptions for each, identifies the basis for controls,
establishes markings, and includes guidance on handling procedures.”93
E.O. 13556 attempted to clear up the potential confusion between
the label of CUI on a record and the FOIA by directly addressing the
relationship (or lack thereof) between the term CUI and release or nonrelease under the FOIA. E.O. 13556 specifically states: “The mere fact
that information is designated as CUI shall not have a bearing on
determinations pursuant to any law requiring the disclosure of
information or permitting disclosure as a matter of discretion, including
disclosures to the legislative or judicial branches.”94 However, in spite
of E.O. 13556’s attempt to clear up the confusion between records or
information identified as CUI and the FOIA, shortly after its
implementation, various federal agencies began to raise questions
concerning the relationship between the FOIA and the Executive Order,
thus requiring NARA and the DoJ to issue supplemental guidance on
November 22, 2011.95 In an updated 2014 joint, co-signed memorandum
entitled Guidance regarding Controlled Unclassified Information and the
Freedom of Information Act, the DoJ and NARA provided the following
guidance:
The FOIA should not be cited as a safeguarding or
dissemination control authority for CUI. The purpose of the
FOIA is to open agency activities to the public.
The FOIA gives the public the right to request and receive
federal agency records unless those records are protected
from disclosure by one of the Act’s exemptions.

92 N AT ’ L ARCHIVES AND R ECORDS ADMIN ., Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)
INFO. Office Notice 2011-01: Initial Implementation Guidance for Executive Order 13556,
(June 9, 2011), httpshttp://www.archives.gov/files/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registrydocuments/2011-cuio-notice-2011-01-initial-guidance.pdf.
93 See CUI Registry, N AT ’ L ARCHIVES AND R ECORDS A DMIN ., http://www.archives.gov
/cui/registry/cui-glossary.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
94 Exec. Order No. 13556 § 2b, 75 Fed. Reg. 68675 (Nov. 4, 2010).
95 Id., rescinded by Memorandum from John P. Fitzpatrick, Director, Information
Security Oversight Office, to Melanie Ann Pustay, Director, Office of Information Policy,
NAT’ L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN ., Revised Guidance regarding Controlled
Unclassified Information and the Freedom of Information Act (July 3, 2014),
http://www.archives.gov/files/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-documents/2014-dojoip-cui-joint-issuance-on-foia.pdf.
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The FOIA exemptions are discretionary. As a result, FOIA
exemptions should not be relied upon as an authority to create
a CUI category or subcategory.
CUI markings are not dispositive of a FOIA reviewer’s
disclosure determination.
Decisions to disclose or withhold information must be made
based on the applicability of the statutory exemptions
contained in the FOIA, not on a CUI marking or designation.
When reviewing records, no markings of any kind, whether
CUI or others that may appear in the same document shall be
applied to require that unclassified information must be
considered exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.
No marking or statement may be paired with a CUI marking
to circumvent the provision of the Executive Order that
designation as CUI does not control disclosure under the
FOIA.
In sum, CUI markings and designations should not be
associated with or paired to the FOIA exemptions and should
not be used as a basis for applying a FOIA exemption.96
Even though E.O. 13556 and the supplemental NARA–DoJ
memorandum have attempted to clear up any relationship between the
FOIA and the CUI label, the confusion between the FOIA and CUI label
will continue to exist, and is actually unavoidable, for a number of
reasons. The first reason is the fact that federal agencies had to provide
NARA with the statute, regulation, or government-wide practice that
justified the label or mark of CUI. Many of the statutes cited as authority
for the dissemination control mark of CUI are statutes routinely cited by
federal agencies for redacting information under the FOIA. Examples of
the statutes include the following:
a. Privacy of Military Personnel,97 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §
130b, Personnel Assigned to Overseas, Sensitive or
Routinely Deployed Units, a statute that may be used by
the DoD to redact specific, personal identifying
information under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
b. International Agreements,98 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 130c,
96 Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., Revised Guidance regarding Controlled
Unclassified Info and the Freedom of Information Act, (July 3, 2014),
http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/policy-guidance/registry-documents/2014-doj-oip-cuijoint-issuance-on-foia.pdf.
97 See CUI Registry: Privacy-Military, N AT ’ L A RCHIVES AND R ECORDS ADMIN .,
http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/privacy-military.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2016).
98 See CUI Registry: International Agreements, N AT ’ L ARCHIVES AND R ECORDS
ADMIN ., http://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/categorydetail/internationalagreements.
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Unclassified, Sensitive Foreign Government, a statute
that may be used by DoD to redact unclassified, sensitive
foreign government information under 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(3).
c. Procurement and Acquisition-Source Selection,99
pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 2102, prohibitions on disclosing
and obtaining procurement information.
d. Geodetic Product Information,100 pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §
455, a statute that may be used by the DoD to redact
defined imagery and maps under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
e. Legal Privilege:101 Examples of records commonly
redacted under the FOIA include the following identified
category or sub-category of records: Attorney Work
Product and/or Attorney Client Communications which
are redacted under FOIA exemption (b)(5).
By referencing a statute (regulation or government practice), FOIA
is automatically brought into consideration because the authority for
dissemination control directly correlates to a FOIA exemption such as
(b)(3), Statutory Basis for Withholding Records, (b)(5), Inter-Agency or
Intra-Agency Memorandum, (b)(6), Personal Privacy Interests/
Information, and/or (b)(7), Records Created for a Law Enforcement
Purpose.
Another reason confusion is unavoidable and will continue to exist
between the CUI label and FOI releases is the limiting language of the
label itself. It does not matter whether the limiting label is CUI or FOUO.
The current DoD regulations clearly state that the dissemination control
label of U//FOUO or FOUO does not automatically mean the record is
withheld under the FOIA. It also clearly states that the lack of any
dissemination control label does not mean that the record is automatically
released under the FOIA and available to the public. Understanding the
dissemination control labels or terms requires understanding the
implementing regulations and guidance pertaining to the label itself and
understanding the process under FOIA, no matter what the label is or
whether the document contains a label.
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
99 See CUI Registry: Procurement and Acquisition-Source Selection, N AT ’ L ARCHIVES
AND R ECORDS ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/
proprietary-source-selection.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
100 See CUI Registry: Geodetic Product Information, N AT ’ L ARCHIVES AND R ECORDS
ADMIN ., https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/geodetic-product-info.
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
101 See CUI Registry: Legal Privilege, N AT ’ L ARCHIVES AND R ECORDS ADMIN .,
https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-detail/legal-privilege.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2016).
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The same Christian Science Monitor article could have been written
with the term CUI on the GAO report rather than FOUO. Just as a federal
agency has the ability to classify a record pursuant to E.O. 13526 at the
time of a FOIA request,102 the government may need to identify a record
as CUI at the time of a FOIA request since the document may not have
been properly labeled (or not labeled) when it was initially drafted,
regardless of meeting the CUI requirements as identified and listed on the
NARA website. The fact that the agency failed to properly mark a record
at the time it was drafted and signed as final should not automatically
determine its release or non-release under the FOIA. For example, if a
federal agency failed to mark medical records as CUI, this failure should
not automatically require the federal agency to release the medical
records at the time the FOIA request is received. In the alternative, just
because a CUI label has been applied to a document, that CUI label
should not automatically mean that the document is not released as it may
have been mislabeled. The review of the CUI record would determine
whether the record is released (or not) under the FOIA, just as the review
of the record labeled FOUO (or not) is released (or not) under the FOIA.
Finally, the confusion between the FOIA and the CUI label will continue
to exist because the NARA website will become an additional resource
to determine the underlying basis for withholding records under FOIA
exemptions (b)(2) through (b)(9), again bringing FOIA into the mix and
continuing the confusion between releases under the FOIA and a limiting
label.
In the end, confusion between SBU or FOUO information and FOIA
will more than likely continue as it is vital to understand the limiting
terminology, be it CUI, FOUO or SBU. While E.O. 13556 and NARA’s
website has all the necessary information to understand the limiting label
of CUI and the basis for the limited distribution, one must be proactive.
FOIA requesters (reporters and congressional staffers) must still read the
guidance, regulation, Executive Order, and information on NARA’s
website in order to educate themselves on why such records are
controlled and have a limited distribution. This Article is skeptical that
this will be achieved based upon the actions of prolific FOIA requesters
and/or those who are skeptical or cynical of the USG’s actions. These
same parties will continue to request the CUI records and/or still question
the USG’s marking/labeling of a record as CUI and argue that the USG’s
true purpose was avoiding release of the record under the FOIA.
Finally, one may conclude that this Article’s argument is against the
CUI terminology or the registry. That is not the case. In fact, this Article

102

Mulrine, supra note 65.
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does not recommend removing the limiting terminology of CUI on any
executive agency’s records as there must be some identification marking
that informs those who process and/or work with the record/information
that it must be safeguard in some manner. In addition, there will be, from
a logical standpoint, a substantial benefit to the USG in using one
government-wide term and program/process for safeguarding CUI. The
establishment of one uniform program for identifying, marking,
safeguarding, and/or disseminating CUI should lead to an effective and
efficient understanding of CUI as having 117 different labels or
dissemination control markings for SBU information is excessive. This
Article is simply skeptical that the NARA registry will clear up the
confusion between the CUI label and releases under the FOIA. The basis
includes those reasons noted above; however, there will always be those
individuals who are suspicious of the USG and ultimately believe that the
federal agencies/individual services are more concerned with their
reputations or are attempting to hide something. Ultimately, only time
will tell whether the task force’s goals will be achieved, at least from the
perspective of release under the FOIA and having a dissemination control
label.
VII. RECORDS C LASSIFIED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526,
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, AND RELEASES
UNDER THE FOIA
Exemption (b)(1), of 5 U.S.C. § 552, authorizes a federal agency to
exempt records or information from mandatory release if the information
is “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order.”103 E.O. 13526 sets out the procedural and substantive
requirements for classifying (and declassifying) records; however, E.O.
13526 also immediately recognizes the tension between release of
information and protecting national security interests with the following
statement:
Our democratic principles require that the American people
be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our
Nation’s progress depends on the free flow of information
both within the Government and to the American people.
Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has
required that certain information be maintained in confidence
in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions,
our homeland security, and our interactions with foreign

103

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2015).
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nations.104
Even though E.O. 13526 provides specifics on procedural and
substantive requirements on classifying and declassifying records, there
is still a level of subjectivity in making these determinations, which
intensifies the tension between release of information and the need to
protect national security interests.
However, understanding the
procedural and substantive requirements articulated in E.O. 13526
hopefully decrease that tension.
A. Which Executive Order Applies to the Classified Information?
Ideally, the first question that should be asked when reviewing
classified records for release under the FOIA is what Executive Order
applies to information classified prior to December 29, 2009, the date of
the current Executive Order, E.O. 13526. As held in Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice,105 “the Executive Order in effect at the time the classifying
official acted states the relevant criteria for purposes of determining
whether Exemption 1 properly was invoked.. . . Thus information once
properly classified under a prior Executive Order will retain the
protection afforded it under the former Order.”106 This is not to say that
a federal agency does not have the opportunity to reevaluate the
continued need to classify the record under the current Executive Order
or the need to reclassify the record at a higher classification level.107
However, the federal agency may invoke exemption (b)(1) for the
withholding of classified information “only if it complies with
classification procedures established by the relevant executive order and
withholds only such material as conforms to the order’s substantive
criteria for classification.”108
B. Procedural Requirements Pursuant to Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information
Some of E.O. 13526’s procedural requirements include who is
authorized to classify a record/information, what record may be
104

Exec. Order No. 13526, at 707.
Lesar, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
106
Id. at 480.
107 Id. It should be noted that because a classification review would occur at the time the
FOIA request is received/processed, in reality, the federal agency would review the need for
continued classification under the E.O. in effect at the time the FOIA request was received.
The Lesar Court was faced with somewhat unusual facts where the E.O. was updated after
the district court issued its decision, and on appeal, the Appellant argued the classification
review should occur under the updated E.O., thus presenting the court the issue of which E.O.
applied to the records. See Lesar, 636 F.2d at 479-480.
108 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 857 F. Supp. 2d. 44, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
aff’d, 715 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
105
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classified, how the record is classified (original classification authority
versus derivative classification authority), identification and marking
requirements, etc. The USG may only classify information that “is
owned by, produced by, or is under the control of the United States
Government.”109 Information may be classified either by an original
classification authority [hereinafter OCA] or via a derivative
classification determination.110 OCAs are the President, the Vice
President, agency heads and officials designated by the President, and
those specifically delegated OCA in accordance with the procedures
outlined in E.O. 13526.111 President Obama delegated OCA to agency
heads on December 29, 2009.112 E.O. 13526 also requires that those that
are delegated OCA (in accordance with E.O 13526) are to be limited to
the minimum number required to implement E.O. 13526.113 The DoD
has further delegated OCAs by position, in accordance with the
requirements outlined in E.O. 13526.114
Derivative classification of information is based upon either an
individual’s reproduction, extraction, or summarization of classified
information, the classification of source material or a security
classification guide.115 As previously mentioned, E.O. 13526 requires the
individual who is derivatively classifying the information to provide
specific details as to how the information was derivatively classified
including the source documents.116
As outlined in E.O. 13526, section 1.2(a), information may only be
classified at three levels and those levels shall be applied to information
based upon an OCA’s determination117 that the unauthorized release of
the information could be expected to cause some level of harm to national
security. As noted, there are only three classification levels and they are
top secret, both secret and confidential.118 In addition to the abovereferenced procedural requirements, a federal agency may classify a

109

Exec. Order No. 13526 § 1.1(a)(2).
Id. pt. 1, § 1(a)(2).
111 Id. pt. 1, § 1.3.
112 Order: Original Classification Authority, 75 Fed. Reg. 735 (Jan. 5, 2010).
113 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.3(c)(1).
114 U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EFENSE , O FFICE OF S EC ’ Y OF D EFENSE 04545-11, D ELEGATION OF
TOP S ECRET ORIGINAL C LASSIFICATION AUTHORITY (2011) and U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
ASST. S EC ’Y OF DEFENSE, DELEGATION OF S ECRET ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
(1995), Supplemented in 2009.
115 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 2, § 2.1.
116 Id. pt. 2, § 2.
117 Id. pt. 1, § 1.2(a) requires an Original Classification Authority to be able to identify
and describe that national security harm.
118 Supra note 68.
110
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record at the time a FOIA request is received;119 however, E.O. 13526
requires a higher level of review of the information to be classified at the
time of a FOIA request in that the federal agency must: (1) meet the
E.O.’s overall requirements and (2) the agency head, the deputy agency
head or the senior agency head (as defined by E.O. 13526, section 5.4)
conducts a document-by-document review.120
The DoD has its own implementing classification procedural
requirements as outlined in DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, DoD
Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information.121 In
addition to the E.O. 13526 and DoD regulations,122 individual Services
and other federal (defense) agencies may choose to supplement E.O.
13526 and the DoD manuals/regulations with their specific component
classification regulations.123
When courts review the classification of records, they examine
whether the federal agency has met both the procedural requirements and
substantive requirements of E.O. 13526. And while there may be defects
in the procedural requirements of classified information at the time a
FOIA request is received (and thus cured after a FOIA request is
received), courts appear to be reluctant to order a federal agency to release
a classified document that otherwise meets the substantive requirements
for classification.124 As noted by the Lesar Court, this result would not
be sensible and “would only be perverse.”125 However, the ability to cure
procedural defects should not be interpreted to mean that courts have
given federal agencies authority to ignore the procedural requirements
mandated under both E.O. 13526 and any supplementing regulations.
Again, as noted by the Lesar Court,
[W]e do not mean to imply that only the substantive standards
of the governing Executive Order must be followed: the
statute requires both procedural and substantive conformity
119 See Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, §1.7(d); see also DoDR-5400.7-R, D EP ’ T OF
DEFENSE F REEDOM OF INFO. ACT P ROGRAM (2006) available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs
/directives/corres/pdf/540007r.pdf.; DoDR-5400.7-R, DEP’T OF DEF. F REEDOM OF INFO.
ACT P ROGRAM , 79 Fed. Reg. 52499 (proposed rule Sep. 3, 2014).
120 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7(d).
121 U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EF. M ANUAL 5200.01, Vol. 2, DO D INFO . S EC. P ROGRAM : M ARKING
OF C LASSIFIED I NFO . (Feb. 24, 2012).
122 DoDM 5200.01 Vol 1, DoDM 5200.01 Vol 2, U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EF. M ANUAL 5200.01,
Vol. 3, DOD INFO. S EC. P ROGRAM : P ROT. OF CLASSIFIED INFO. (Feb. 24, 2012).
123 See e.g., U.S. D EP ’ T OF THE A IR F ORCE , INSTRU . 31-401, I NFO . S EC . P ROGRAM
M GMT. (Nov. 1, 2005), as amended; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 380-5, DEP’T OF THE
ARMY INFO . S EC . P ROGRAM (Sep. 29, 2000).
124 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 857 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
aff’d, 715 F.3d 937, D.C. Cir. (2013); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 478,
484 (1980).
125 See Lesar, 636 F.2d at 484.
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for proper classification. Rather we recognize that the
consequences of particular violations may vary; some
substantive violations may require either a remand to the
district court for in camera inspection of the materials or the
release of the documents. For procedural violations, some
may be of such importance to reflect adversely on the
agency’s overall classification decision, requiring a remand
to the district court for in camera inspection; while others may
be insignificant, undermining
not at all the agency’s
classification decision.126
The Lesar Court also noted that the then existing E.O. [E.O. 12065]
contained a provision that allowed classification of a document after the
date of its origination (or at the time of the FOIA request), 127 which is
consistent with the current E.O. It simply requires a higher level of
review. Finally, E.O. 13526 has attempted to correct procedural defect
arguments with the following statement: “information assigned a level of
classification under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as
classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other
required markings.”128 While a federal agency should not rely upon this
particular sentence as carte blanche to avoid procedural classification
requirements, it is at least available for use by a federal agency in
defending a procedural classification defect. And, even though one may
cite E.O. 13526, section 1.6(f) when defending a procedural classification
defect, the federal agency should correct the procedural error once the
error is discovered.
C. Substantive Requirements Pursuant to Executive Order 13526,
Classified National Security Information
E.O. 13526 also outlines the substantive requirements for
classifying records and/or information, and those substantive
requirements include the category of information that can be classified
and the level of harm to national security. First, the record or information
that may be classified must fall within one (or more) of the eight (8)
enumerated categories listed in the E.O.: (a) military plans, weapons
systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c)
intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources, or
methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the
126

Id. at 485.
Id. at 484, Exec. Order No. 12065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (1978), as amended. Exec.
Order No. 12065 and Exec. Order No. 13526 authorize classification of a record/information
after a FOIA request is received, although with a higher level review by the deciding official
(e.g. agency head or deputy agency head for Exec. Order No. 12065 and agency head, deputy
agency head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4 for Exec. Order No.
13526).
128 Exec. Order No. 13526 pt., 1, § 1.6(f).
127
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United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (f)
United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the
national security; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons
of mass destruction.129
The second substantive requirement is that federal agents must be
able to articulate the harm to national security at one of the three
classification levels of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. It is also
important for one to be aware that national security is defined as “the
national defense or foreign relations of the United States”130 and the
“defense against transnational terrorism.”131
While not identified as a substantive requirement, E.O. 13526
specifically prohibits the classification of information, continued
classification or failure to declassify information in order to (a) conceal
inefficiency, administrative error or violations of law; (b) avoid or
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; (c) restrict
competition; or (d) delay the information’s release when the information
no longer requires the protection in the interest of the national security.132
D. Judicial Standard of Review and Analysis for Classified
Records Requested Under the FOIA
When a federal agency withholds records pursuant to exemption
(b)(1), the FOIA requester’s avenue of redress of the agency’s decision
is through the judicial system, with a court’s de novo review and the
burden upon the federal agency to articulate the justification for
withholding of the record.133 Again, exemption (b)(1) cases are routinely
adjudicated via summary judgment as:
[s]ummary judgment is warranted on the basis of agency
affidavits when the affidavits describe the justifications for
nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate
that the information withheld logically falls within the
claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either
contrary
evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad
faith.134
Facially, exemption (b)(1) cases appear to be no different than
129

Id. pt. 1, § 1.4.
Id. pt. 6, § 6.1(cc).
131 Id. pt. 1, § 1.1(a)(4).
132 Id. pt. 1, § 1.7(a).
133 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
134 Larsen v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (citing Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d.
773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
130

ECKART - MACRO - 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

9/5/2017 3:28 PM

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

269

litigation pertaining to the withholding of information and records under
other FOIA exemptions (i.e. 5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(2) through (b)(9)).
However, the complexity of cases pertaining to classified information,
national security, and protection of the United States is pronounced and
best summarized by Judge Colleen McMahon, of the Washington D.C.
District Court, when faced with the FOIA litigation involving The New
York Times’ and American Civil Liberties Union’s FOIA requests for
copies of legal opinions and memorandum that articulated the legal
determination and analysis of targeted killing, and more specifically, the
targeted killing of U.S. citizens.135 Judge McMahon stated:
The FOIA requests here in issue implicate serious issues
about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and about
whether we are indeed a nation of laws, not of men. The
Administration has engaged in public discussion of the
legality of targeted killing, even of citizens, but in cryptic and
imprecise ways, generally without citing to any statute or
court decision that justifies its conclusions. More fulsome
disclosure of the legal reasoning on which the Administration
relies to justify the targeted killing of individuals, including
United States citizens, far from any recognizable “hot” field
of battle, would allow for intelligent discussion and
assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains
hotly debated. It might also help the public understand the
scope of the ill-defined yet vast and seemingly ever-growing
exercise in which we have engaged for well over a decade, at
great cost in lives, treasure, and (at least in the minds of some)
personal liberty.
However, this Court is constrained by law, and under the law,
I can only conclude that the Government has not violated
FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the
FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of
law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not
violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The
Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost
on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find
myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot
solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and
rules—a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the
thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the
Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly
lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible
with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for
its conclusions a secret. But under the law as I understand it
to have developed, the Government’s
motion for summary
judgment must be granted…136
135 See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014).
136 Id. at 515-16.
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Another reason for the complexity of classified FOIA exemptions is
the subject matter expertise associated with classified information and
national security harm. Generally, courts accord substantial weight to a
federal agency’s decision, as articulated in declarations, to classify and/
or withhold classified records.137 While E.O. 13526, section 1.4,
identifies, with a fair degree of certainty, what types of information may
be classified, the agency’s decision to classify specific information is not
immune from litigation138 as there is always some level of subjectivity to
classification determinations because they are generally based upon a
future event and a risk assessment of that event’s impact to national
security.139 Classified exemption cases are complex because the subject
matter expertise resides with the federal agency and not within the
judiciary:
Because courts ‘lack the expertise necessary to second-guess
such agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA
case,’ we ‘must accord substantial weight to an agency’s
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the
disputed record.’ If any agency’s affidavit describes the
justifications for withholding the information with specific
detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically
falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by
contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s
bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis
of the affidavit alone. Moreover, a reviewing court ‘must
take into account . . . that any affidavit or other agency
statement of threatened harm to national security will always
be speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a
potential future harm. ‘Ultimately, an agency’s justification
for invoking a FOIA 140
exemption is sufficient if it appears
‘logical’ or plausible.’
One may question why the courts have applied this standard of
“logical and plausible” or why the courts have given such deference to
the federal government concerning classified information; however, the
courts have explained this deference in various ways, but ultimately, it
appears to be that the courts simply do not have the required expertise
and one could say, do not want to acquire the expertise.
a. “[I]n the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to
executive affidavits predicting harm to national security,
and have141
found it unwise to undertake searching judicial
review.”
137

Id. at 551.
See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 857 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.C. Cir.
2012), aff’d, 715 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2013), Amnesty Int’l USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Larson v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
139 Larson, 565 F.3d at 868.
140 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
141 Id. at 624 (citing Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
138
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b. “The judiciary ‘is in an extremely poor position to
second-guess the predictive judgments made by the
government’s intelligence agencies regarding questions
such as whether a country’s changed political climate has
yet neutralized
the risk of harm to national
security. . .’”142
c. “We ‘accord substantial weight to any agency’s affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the
disputed record because the Executive departments
responsible for national defense and foreign policy
matters have unique insights into what adverse effects
[sic] might
occur as a result of a particular classified
record.’”143
d. If an agency’s statements are reasonably specific to show
that the withheld information “logically falls within the
claimed exemption and evidence in the record does not
suggest otherwise . . . the court should not conduct a more
detailed inquiry to test the agency’s judgment and
expertise or to evaluate
whether the court agrees with the
agency’s opinions.”144
e. “[C]ourts are generally ill-equipped to second-guess the
Executive’s opinion in the national security context. . . .
‘[W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits
predicting harm to national security and have found
it
unwise to undertaking searching judicial review.’”145
f. “It lies beyond the power of this Court to declassify a
document that has been classified in accordance with
proper procedures on the ground that the court does not
think the information contained therein ought to be kept
secret. (‘[T]he text of Exemption 1 suggests that little
proof or explanation is required beyond a plausible
assertion that information is properly classified.’).”146
In some cases, plaintiffs have requested that courts conduct an oncamera review of the redacted records based upon their questions,
concerns, and/or allegations of the agency’s determination that the
information remain classified. Some of the concerns include continued

927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
142 Larsen, 565 F.3d at 865.
143 Id. at 864 (citing Ctr. For Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918,
927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
144 Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 699 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (2010)
(citing Larsen v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
145 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
146 N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 560 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014).
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classification given the passage of time, the reasons noted in the
affidavits/declarations are often repetitive or similar to past declarations
(in prior cases), and/or the federal agency uses similar arguments/
statements concerning national security harm. In effect, this argues that
the federal agency has failed to faithfully consider each FOIA case on its
own particular facts147 (i.e. a cookie-cutter approach by the federal
agency), and thus the court is required to or should conduct a further or
more detailed review of the redacted records.148 Again, the Larson Court
stated that such requests for:
further judicial inquiry [are] not required by–indeed is even
contrary to–our precedent. ‘Once satisfied that proper
procedures have been followed and that the information
logically falls from into the exemption claimed, the courts
need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to
question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue
of good faith.’ Not only have we counseled that courts not
go further, we have held that ‘the court is not to conduct a
detailed inquiry’ if the agency’s statements meet the
preliminary standard. . . . Plaintiffs [have] suggested that . . .
the agencies do not faithfully consider FOIA requests but
issue boilerplate responses, which should spur the court to
require more explanation. However, when the potential harm
to national security in different cases is the same, it makes
sense that the agency’s stated reasons for nondisclosure will
be the same . . . the fact that similar exemption
explanations . . . is not a cause for further judicial inquiry.149
VIII. PROHIBITIONS ON C LASSIFYING SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF
INFORMATION
The Executive Order prohibits federal agencies from classifying,
declassifying, or continuing the classification of records in any case in
order to: conceal violations of law, inefficient, or administrative error;
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrain
competition; or prevent or delay the release of information that does not
require protection in the interest of the national security. 150 Given these
prohibitions, some FOIA requesters have recently argued that federal
agencies have classified various documents/records in violation of these
prohibitions and thus the documents may not be classified by the federal
agency.151
147

Larsen, 565 F.3d at 868.
Id. at 867.
149 Id. at 869 (citations omitted).
150 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7.
151 See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 664 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 628
F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also Amnesty Int’l U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
148
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The critical question about these prohibitions is what if the classified
record or information itself reveals a violation of law or is embarrassing
to the USG and the very nature of release of the record/information would
lead to harm to national security, including threats of international
terrorism or threats against the U.S. military. Does this mean that a
federal agency cannot classify the record or maintain the classification of
record? Since September 11, 2001, the USG has defended a number of
FOIA cases in which the plaintiff argued that because the underlying
activity is illegal or unauthorized or no longer authorized, federal
agencies cannot classify the information or the record loses its protection
of classification.152 However, the fact that the conduct itself is unlawful,
does not (in and of itself) preclude the possibility that the materials/
information/records may contain information of such a sensitive nature,
the disclosure of which could (still) lead to national security harm. 153
One of the earlier court cases to address this issue was Lesar v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, where the FBI surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King
exceeded the lawful limits.154 As noted by the Lesar Court, the FBI
surveillance of Dr. King may have strayed beyond the bounds of its initial
lawful security purpose. However, this did not preclude the possibility
that the actual surveillance records and the task force materials
(investigation of the FBI’s surveillance) may nevertheless contain
information of a sensitive nature. The disclosure of this information
could compromise legitimate secrecy needs.155
The issue of illegal conduct was addressed more recently in Amnesty
International, U.S. [hereinafter AI] v. CIA.156 President Obama (shortly
after assuming office) had prohibited enhanced interrogation techniques
[hereinafter EIT] (other than those that fell within the DA Field Manual)
and directed the closure of Central Intelligence Agency [hereinafter CIA]
detention facilities. In this case, AI argued that the CIA records
pertaining to past EITs (authorized but now prohibited) were outside of
the CIA’s mandate and were not intelligence sources or methods. The
CIA withheld the records under both Exemption (b)(3)157 and (b)(1). The
AI Court found that the CIA had met its burden for withholding the
See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), ACLU v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2013), ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir.
2013), ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2012), Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728
F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
156267 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2011)).
153 See Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (1980).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 483.
156 See Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
157 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
152
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records under both exemptions and rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments as
to why the records were not or no longer classified and would not result
in harm to the national security.158 The AI Court first noted that “‘[i]f an
agency’s statements supporting exemption contain reasonable specificity
of detail as to demonstrate that the withheld information logically falls
within the claimed exemption and evidence in the record does not suggest
otherwise . . . the court should not conduct a more detailed inquiry to test
the agency’s judgment and expertise or to evaluate whether the court
agrees with the agency’s opinions.’”159 In regards to the now prohibited
EITs and detention facilities, the AI Court noted that AI, in effect, argued
“that because some of the CIA’s techniques are illegal, the CIA therefore
classified the documents to conceal the alleged illegality.” 160 The court
concluded that AI has only made this allegation or argument, and did not
provide any support for its theory, stating:
A finding of bad faith must be grounded in ‘evidence
suggesting bad faith on the part of the [agency]. Ultimately,
an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is
sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.’” . . . [T]he fact
that the interrogation methods may now be considered illegal
does not mean that the161information cannot be withheld
pursuant to Exemption 1.
In the end, the AI Court found that the federal government had met
its burden for withholding the classified records.162
The Washington D.C. Federal Courts have also adjudicated the issue
of prohibited interrogation techniques in the case of ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t
of Defense.163 In this case, the DoD partially denied the ACLU’s request
for various records pertaining to fourteen high-value detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In this case, the ACLU also argued that because
President Obama had prohibited the EITs and closed the detention facility
(at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), the DoD (and CIA) could no longer continue
to classify the records. The ACLU Court, like the AI Court, found that
“[t]o the extent that the ACLU’s claim rests on the ACLU’s belief that
enhanced interrogation techniques were illegal, there is no legal support
for the conclusion that illegal activities cannot produce classified
documents. In fact, history teaches the opposite. Documents concerning
surveillance activities later deemed illegal may still produce information
that may be properly withheld under exemption 1.”164
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 507-508.
Id. at 510-511.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 530.
See ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 622 (citing Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

ECKART - MACRO - 9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

9/5/2017 3:28 PM

275

In this particular case, the DoD (and CIA) articulated five harms to
national security; the first four harms pertained to CIA techniques,
priorities and foreign governments. The fifth harm to national security
was al Qaeda’s use of the information as propaganda. It is interesting to
note that the ACLU challenged the fifth basis as to whether one could use
the records as propaganda and whether this propaganda use would
(actually) harm national security. The ACLU argued that the real reason
the CIA had not released the records was because they would be
embarrassing to the United States, and possibly reveal violations of law.
And, because the Executive Order expressly prohibits the classification
of records that would be embarrassing or reveal violations of law, the
records cannot be withheld under the FOIA as classified records. 165 The
court chose not to decide the issue as to whether the information could be
used as propaganda and whether the information could harm national
security. The court concluded the government’s four other reasons of
national security harm were sufficient for non-release of the records as
“[i]n the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to executive
affidavits predicting harm to national security, and have found it unwise
to undertake searching judicial review.”166
In another attempt to obtain information pertaining to EITs, the
ACLU requested documents from the DoJ’s Office of Professional
Responsibility as to whether any DoJ attorneys had “breached
professional or ethical obligations in authorizing the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques.”167 In this case, the ACLU did not argue that
the EITs records could not be classified based upon President Obama’s
prohibition of their use (although authorized at one time). Instead, the
ACLU argued that the EITs were “unlawful [from their first use] and
therefore fall outside the protection of ‘intelligence sources and methods’
granted by those exemptions [(b)(1) and (b)(3)].”168 However, the court
again concluded in favor of the USG and stated “[t]o the extent that the
ACLU’s claim rests on the ACLU’s belief that the EIT were illegal, there
is no legal support for the conclusion that illegal activities cannot produce
classified documents. In fact, history teaches the opposite.”169 The court
noted that “[w]hile some of the documents shed light on the legality or
165 Id. at 624 (citing Exec. Order No. 12958, pt. 1, § 1.7, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825, (Apr. 20,
1995)).
166 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Ctr. For Nat’l
Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
167 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156267, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The ACLU submitted its FOIA request on December 4, 2009.
168 Id. at *15.
169 Id. (citing ACLU v. U.S. DoD, 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); ACLU v. Dep’t of
Defense, 723 F. Supp. 2d 621, 628-629 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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illegality of the CIA’s conduct, the (b)(1) or (b)(3) claims are not pretextual. Any possibility of illegal conduct on the part of the CIA does not
defeat the validity of the exemptions claimed.”170 In other words, the
Court found that the USG had provided a logical and plausible rationale
for the redaction of the records as classified, and whether the actions were
legal or illegal at the time and/or authorized or unauthorized at the time
of classification was not in and of itself dispositive.171
In yet another attempt to obtain records pertaining to EITs, the
ACLU submitted a FOIA request for eleven reports from the CIA’s
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) that pertained to the “detention,
interrogation, or treatment of individuals apprehended after September
11, 2001, and held at detention facilities outside the United States.”172
The ACLU subsequently modified its FOIA request to “only
‘descriptions in the OIG reports of the use of unauthorized interrogation
methods.’”173 The CIA withheld the records under both Exemption (b)(1)
and Exemption (b)(3)174 and the court (again) found that the CIA had met
its burden for withholding the records under both exemptions.175 In this
particular case, the ACLU again attempted to distinguish the FOIA
request for the OIG records from the other cases by stating that the
interrogation techniques were (both) illegal and unauthorized at the time
of use (as opposed to illegal but authorized) and outside of the CIA’s
mandate.176 The court rejects this argument, based upon Sims v. CIA,177
and notes that “what matters is that the activity was conducted for
intelligence purposes, not that it was illegal or unauthorized.” 178 In
addition, the fact that the activities are outside the charter of the CIA is
“immaterial to the determination of whether they [the activities] fell
under ‘intelligence sources or methods.’”179
Classified information cases will never be easy as they pertain to
“important issues arising at the intersection of the public’s opportunity to
obtain information about their government’s activities and the legitimate
170

Id. (citing Agee v. C.I.A., 524 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (D.C. Cir.1981)).
Id.
172 ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The ACLU submitted its
FOIA request on April 25, 2011.
173 ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 240 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
174 As noted by the court, the analysis of “intelligence sources and methods” under
exemption (b)(1) and (b)(3), statutory exemptions, are routinely the same. ACLU v. CIA,
892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 736-737,
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
175 Id. at 245.
176 Id.
177 See Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 1159 (1985).
178 ACLU v. CIA, 892 F. Supp. 2d 234, 244 (citing Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 1159 (1985)).
179 Id. at 245 (citing Navasky v. CIA, 499 F. Supp. 269, 273-274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
171
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interests of the Executive Branch in maintaining secrecy about matters of
national security.”180
However, what is clear is that FOIA requesters appear to think that
just because the information reveals an illegal action (or the action is or
was prohibited and/or unauthorized) or is embarrassing to the USG, that
fact in and of itself prohibits the government from classifying records.
This narrow construction or interpretation of E.O. 13526 is simply not
logical. The logical interpretation of E.O. 13526 is that the information
cannot be classified based only upon or for the sole purpose of concealing
violations of law, inefficiencies or administrative error; preventing
embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; restraining
competition; or preventing or delaying the release of information that
does not require protection in the interest of the national security. 181 This
is the only conclusion that makes sense, at least from a national security
perspective.
It is interesting to note that there is one recent FOIA litigation case
where records were not classified and withheld under exemption (b)(1)
but rather withheld only under (b)(6) and (b)(7). This case involved an
ACLU FOIA request, submitted to the DoD on October 7, 2003, for
various photographs of detainee abuses.182 The ACLU subsequently filed
suit against the DoD and other federal agencies on June 2, 2004, and the
litigation continued for over ten years. 183 It is unclear why DoD only
claimed exemption (b)(6), personal privacy interests, and (b)(7)(C), law
enforcement records and personal privacy interests, as authority for
withholding the photographs and did not claim exemption (b)(1), use as
propaganda and harm to national security. 184 While some may disagree,
a strong argument exists that such photographs could be classified
pursuant to exemption (b)(1) based upon national security harm to the
United States, its citizens and residents, to the DoD, and more specifically
to military members and/or units or installations. Given the recent attacks
(or threats of attacks) against military service members and their families,
military installations and/or recruiting stations, etc. both in the United
States and in United States Central Command’s [hereinafter
CENTCOM’s] area of responsibility [hereinafter AoR], the harm to
national security is real. Examples of attacks or threats of attacks include
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2014).
Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.7.
182 See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, ACLU v. DoJ, 681 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2012).
183 See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 40 F. Supp. 3d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
184 The Dep’t of Defense also argued (b)(7)(F) as a basis for withholding the photographs;
however, the court also rejected exemption (b)(7)(F) as a basis for withholding the
photographs. See, ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 389 F. Supp. 2d. 547, 568-579 (2005).
180
181
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the following:
a. Two American service members were killed by an
Afghanistan soldier in a series of deaths based upon antiAmericanism
as a result of the burning of Korans by U.S.
soldiers.185
b. An Afghanistan police officer opened fire on U.S. and
Afghanistan forces, killing two U.S.
service members and
three Afghanistan police officers.186
c. As noted by Representative Peter King of New York,
“People in uniform are symbols of the United States.
They’re symbols of American might . . . And if they
(military personnel) can be killed,
that is a great
propaganda victory for Al Qaeda.”187
d. The Cyber Caliphate, an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) affiliated hacker group, hijacked the
Twitter
Account of Military Spouses of Strength188 189
to post
“Creepy threats against members of the group.”
e. The CENTCOM’s Twitter account was also recently
hacked by supporters of ISIS or the Islamic State in Iraq
and Levant (ISIL), and the hackers posted the following
messages:
“AMERICAN SOLDIERS, WE ARE
COMING, WATCH YOU BACK. You’ll see no mercy
infidels. ISIS is already here, we are in your PCs, in each
military base. With Allah’s permission we are in
CENTCOM now. We won’t stop! We know everything
about your wives
and children. U.S. Soldiers! We’re
watching you!”190
The propaganda value by extremists concerning successful attacks
185

2 US Troops Killed in Afghanistan Following Koran Burning, ASSOCIATED P RESS
(Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/01/2-troops-killed-byafghan-soldier-civilian/.
186 Afghan Police Officer Reportedly Fills 2 US Troops, 3 Afghans in ‘Insider’ Attack,
ASSOCIATED P RESS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/11/afghanpolice-officer-allegedly-kills-2-us-troops. This attack occurred two days after a deadline set
by President Karzai for U.S. Special Forces to withdraw from the area following allegations
of abuse.
187 Catherine Herridge, Military a Growing Terrorist Target, Lawmakers Warn, FOX
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/12/06/military-growingterrorist-target-lawmakers-warn/.
188 A group that “aims to improve mental health awareness by providing resources and
knowledge through tangible programing.” See John Hayward, ISIS-Aligned ‘Cyber
Caliphate’ Hacker Go After Military Spouses of Strength, ABQ JOURNAL (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/11/isis-aligned-cybercaliphate-hackersgo-after-military-spouses-of-strength/.
189 Id.
190 Caitlin Dickson, U.S. Military Command’s Twitter Account Hacked, Y AHOO N EWS
(Jan. 12, 2015, 1:17 P.M.), http://news.yahoo.com/u-s—military-command-s-twitteraccount-apparently-hacked-by-isis-181757697.html.
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against the United States, DoD, and U.S. military members and/or their
families (whether the misconduct is substantiated or not) is real. While
the articles cited above originated a number of years after the 2004 ACLU
FOIA litigation for the release of the photographs (and could explain why
DoD did not assert exemption (b)(1)), the harm to military members and
their families, installations, U.S. citizens, and the United States is real and
not simply speculative. This harm and risk of harm must be considered
in future litigations from the perspective of national security harm, as
defined by E.O. 13526.
IX. WAIVER OF CLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION – OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE WIKILEAKS ARGUMENTS
A FOIA requester may compel a federal agency to release otherwise
classified information or records if the federal agency has “officially
acknowledged” the information/record and thus has waived its ability to
claim the exemption.191 In some cases, FOIA requesters will argue that
because the record or information is already publicly available
(sometimes citing various internet sites or news reports), the federal
agency cannot now claim that the information is classified. 192
For waiver cases, FOIA requesters have the burden of establishing
that the federal agency has “officially acknowledged” the information/
record.193 In addition, E.O. 13526 clearly states, “[c]lassified information
shall not be automatically declassified as a result of any unauthorized
disclosure of identical or similar information . . .”194 Courts have
examined the issue of official release and have articled the following
three-prong test:
Classified information ‘is deemed to have been officially
disclosed only if it (1) “[is] as specific as the information
previously released,” (2) “match[es] the information
previously disclosed,” and (3) was “made public through an
official and documented disclosure.” As to the last factor,
“the law will not infer official disclosure of information
classified by the CIA from (1) widespread public discussion
of a classified matter, (2) statements made by a person not
authorized to speak for the Agency, or (3) release of
information by another agency, or even by Congress.” . . .
Indeed, “the fact that the government disclosed general
information on its interrogation program does not require full
See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Amnesty Int’l,
U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
193 See e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Billington v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 233
F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2000), Amnesty Int’l, U.S. v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
194 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.1(b)(2)b.
191
192
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disclosure 195
of aspects of the program that remain
classified.”‘
The court further noted that “[a]n agency’s official acknowledgment
of information . . . cannot be based on mere public speculation, no matter
how widespread.”196 Another court phrased it as follows: There is “‘a
critical difference between official and unofficial disclosures,’ and the
mere ‘fact that information exists in some form in the public domain does
not necessarily mean that official disclosure will not cause [cognizable]
harm.’”197 In the case of documents available because of a WikiLeaks
disclosure, this particular court went on to say that it was simply no
substitute for an “official acknowledgement.”198
It should be clear that case law is consistent with E.O. 13526’s
statement that “[c]lassified information shall not be declassified
automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or
similar information.”199 Will this clear language within case law and in
the current Executive Order stop those from arguing before a court that
the information is already available to the public and does not require the
continued classification by the federal agency? As with the new
E.O. 13556200 and the premise that it will clear up confusion between CUI
and releases under the FOIA, this author is skeptical that FOIA requesters
will cease citing WikiLeaks (and now Edward Snowden) as a basis for
discontinued classification of information or records. This skepticism is
based upon the fact that the ACLU argued a leaked report by the
International Red Cross as the basis for declassification of records and/or
questioned the continued need for the classification of records pertaining
to fourteen high value detainees.201
X. SUMMARY
As noted in the beginning of this article, Congress believed it had
achieved a workable solution or balance between the public’s right to
know and/or right of access to government records and the USG’s need
to protect itself and its citizens. However, on September 11, 2001, the
United States was attacked on its own soil and this had not happened
since December 7, 1941, the day Pearl Harbor was attacked. The tension
195 Amnesty Int’l U.S., 728 F. Supp. 2d at 508-509 (citing ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
664 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
196 Id. at 512 (citing Wolf v. CIA 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
197 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp. 2d 215, 223-224, (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
198 Id. at 223-24 (citing Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
199 Exec. Order No. 13526, pt. 1, § 1.1(c).
200 75 Fed. Reg. 68,675 (Nov. 9, 2010).
201 ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 664 F. Supp. 2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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that existed between access to government records and national security
interests (whether they are classified or sensitive but unclassified
information) is even more apparent since that fateful day of September
11, 2001. National security concerns are somewhat speculative (as they
are based upon a future event as noted by the Larsen Court202); however,
they are also real. As it has been said (in terms of protecting the United
States), we, the United States, have to be right all the time, while those
that wish to harm the United States only need to be right once. It is
reasonable to conclude that FOIA litigation pertaining to national security
interests will continue now and into the future. When writing this Article,
the author was drawn to a statement made by Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein
in the early stages of the FOIA litigation involving various records related
to the detainees under the custody of the United States (discussed
above).203 Judge Hellerstein wrote the following:
My inquiry with respect to the documents in issue is
particularly acute. Our nation has been at war with terrorists
since their September 11, 2001 suicide crashes into the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, killing thousands and wounding our nation in
ways that we still cannot fully recount – indeed, we were at
war with terrorists since well before that event. American
soldiers are fighting and dying daily in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The morale of our nation is a vital concern and directly affects
the welfare of our soldiers. How then to deal with the
commands of FOIA and the strong policy it reflects ‘to
promote honest and open government,’ to assure the
existence of an informed citizenry,’ and ‘to hold the
governors accountable to the governed’? Of course, national
security and the safety and integrity of our soldiers, military
and intelligence operations are not to be compromised, but is
our nation better preserved by trying to squelch relevant
documents that otherwise would be produced for fear of
retaliation by an enemy that needs no pretext to attack? FOIA
places a heavy responsibility on the judge to determine ‘de
novo’ if documents withheld by an agency are properly
withheld under an exemption and, if necessary,
to examine
the withheld documents ‘in camera’. . . .204
Most individuals would agree with Judge Hellerstein’s comment
that the FOIA has placed a heavy responsibility upon judges who have to
determine, de novo, whether classified records should be released over a
federal agency’s objections. In addition and to a certain extent, Judge
Hellerstein’s comment is that the USG’s enemy, since September 11,
2001, does not need a pretext to attack. However, this author would go
one step further and ask one additional question: Do we need to give the
202
203
204

Larson, 565 F.3d at 857.
See ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 550.
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enemy an excuse to attack the United States or use government
information/records as propaganda to encourage those to attack the
United States, be it from within the United States or outside of the United
States? In other words, how many U.S. service members’ lives (or U.S.
citizens or residents) are worth release of this information? In his
discussion on the need for openness versus secrecy and national security,
Judge Hellerstein wrote “[h]istorians will evaluate, and legislators
debate, how wise it is for a society to give such regard to secrecy.” 205
However, in the end, this Article concludes that it will be historians,
legislators, theologians and philosophers who will debate how wise it is
for a society to give such regard to openness and whether that value is
greater or was greater than the lives lost as a result of that release or
openness.

205

Id. at 562.

